Document Type : Original Article
Highlights
Public expectations from governments is different with Principle of legitimate expectations in administrative law. Protection of legitimate expectations in administrative law traditionally draws our attention to vertical relationships between the State and an individual. Historically Principle of legitimate expectations in administrative law has been regarded as a distinctive protective principle for protecting citizens against government and administrative authorities. It seeks to resolve the basic conflict between the desire to protect the individual’s confidence in expectations raised by administrative conduct and the need for administrators to pursue changing policy objectives. The principle means that expectations raised as a result of administrative conduct may have legal consequences. Either the administration must respect those expectations or provide compelling reasons why the public interest must take priority
Legitimate expectations in administrative law is not a consistent theory, but primarily is the product of judicial precedent of various jurisdictions. But as long as is concerned to England, this principle like other overview principles is a judicial reaction to discretionary powers of administration and (unlike Germany and EU) has been applied in various situations.
In the European Community the institutions adopt rules or regulations for ends specified under the Treaties. Principles which condition the achievement of such ends are seen as a necessary feature of legitimate administration, and in Germany, the concept of protecting legitimate expectations addresses an important aspect of the idea of legal certainty, and it does so from the perspective of the citizen. whereas in English law public authorities typically have wide discretionary powers conferred upon them by statute, for which no ends are specified and the imposition of any principles is seen as an illegitimate interference with such power. As English courts tend to refuse to undertake a more constructive role in administration they retreat into vague assessments of unreasonableness.
The English judiciary has made some attempt to examine the principles behind the doctrine. This is explored in Part I, where it is seen that the courts have contended that the principles of fairness, abuse of power and good administration explain the doctrine. although these principles are no doubt relevant but, given their abstract nature, they do not provide sufficient guidance as to the scope and proper application of the doctrine,
Faced with values found in the cases that are individually appealing but which may come into conflict with one another, one response is to adopt a pluralist approach, Rather than assigning priority to any one value. Lastly, it is argued that the doctrine is concerned to protect trust which has been reposed in public officials pursuant to a representation which they have made. This explanation enhances our understanding, and provides guidance in difficult cases, ensuring the proper application of the doctrine. What is needed is some principle which sits comfortably within these broad objectives and which can enhance our understanding of what the doctrine is specifically seeking to achieve so as to provide appropriate delimitation and guidance. Specific trust gives content to the principles of fairness, abuse of power and good administration in the particular context of a legitimate expectations claim. It excludes inappropriate and misguided use of the doctrine, reserving its application to cases where it is genuinely warranted.
This article with a descriptive method tries to approach to and recognize legitimate expectation in negative way: from trying to find and recognize a separate justifying base for legitimate expectations in legal doctrine and judicial precedent especially in England, as mentioned above, to recognition of distinctions to discern interior elements of the principle (legitimate expectations from reasonable expectations, legitimate expectations from legally enforceable rights and interests, legitimate expectations and contractual expectations, emphasis on internalist approach to legitimacy in contradiction with externalist approach to legitimacy and recognition of legitimate expectations as an enforceable interest in public law).
Let me begin with what legitimate expectations are not: distinguishing legitimate from merely reasonable expectations. In ordinary conversation we sometimes use the term ‘reasonable expectation’ to mean a prediction about the future that it would be reasonable for someone to have, such as based on sound epistemic reasons. the basic difference between reasonable expectations and legitimate expectations is simply that the former do not, but the latter do, have legal consequences. It is also true that this way of drawing the distinction is not matched in other areas of law.
Principle of legitimate expectations is also distinct from legally enforceable rights and interests. legitimate expectations must also be carefully distinguished from contractual rights and obligations. Contractual rights and obligations are rooted in agreements that typically involve reciprocal representations, with promises coming from both sides. It is certainly true that a promise can create a legitimate expectation. However, in the case of legitimate expectations, unlike contractual rights and obligations, it is not necessary and not customary for the promise to be reciprocal. What is more, some types of legitimate expectations can be created even in the absence of any promises or representations,
such as based on past practices.
Similarly, we must emphasize on internalist approach to legitimacy in contradiction with externalist approach to legitimacy. The legal order in which the expectation emerged involves a conception of
justice and fairness; this conception is what called the internal normativity in in contradiction with externalist approach to legitimacy that is based on an external norms or values.
Lastly, we have to emphasize on considering public interests in judicial recognizing an enforceable interests in public law, such as protecting legitimate expectations. This means in contrary to private law, in many cases there is no correlativity of rights (and interests) and duties in public law.
Daly, Paul, A Pluralist Account of Deference and Legitimate Expectations (September 10, 2015). In: Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World, Hart Publishing, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2658645 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2658645 .
The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Jul., 2006), pp. 254-256.