Document Type : Original Article
Highlights
Article Abstract:
The "parliament", as the most central governing body among the three powers, has the task of "legislating". This puts this institution in a privileged position vis-a-vis the executive and the judiciary; Because the executive branch implements the law passed by the parliament and the judiciary judges according to the law passed by the parliament. From this perspective, monitoring parliamentary approvals and monitoring the professional conduct of deputies will be doubly important and will strengthen the idea of good governance or "good governance".
Since the beginning of the "democracy" movement, one of the most important questions that has existed among legal thinkers and continues to be scrutinized is whether the actions of members of parliament should be "monitored" and controlled, as well as parliamentary resolutions. Or basically what is the need to monitor the actions and professional conduct of the delegates? The result of this historical conflict ultimately manifested itself in the inevitability of monitoring both. In the Iranian legal system, "monitoring parliamentary resolutions" is within the competence of the Guardian Council in terms of its compliance with Sharia and the Constitution, which is carried out in accordance with various constitutional principles, including Articles 72, 94, 95 and 96; However, the first step in the field of "monitoring members of parliament" in Iran took practical form with the approval of the Law on Monitoring the Conduct of Deputies (1/15/2012). The main philosophy of monitoring the professional conduct of members of parliament is to respect the dignity of the representative; But the ultimate goal of this type of monitoring can be summarized in three important principles. First, to prevent the "conflict of interest" (personal and group) of the representative with the public interest. Second, strengthening the "accountability" of public officials, and third, the "accountability" of representatives to the nation, which is on the other side of the coin.
The basic function of oversight is anti-corruption, and this will be facilitated by continuous and efficient oversight; Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to analyze the competencies of the institution that oversees the professional conduct of the delegates (the Board of Oversight of the Deputies) and to identify the type, nature and scope of the oversight envisaged in this regard. Therefore, research on it is considered as one of the main priorities in the Iranian legal system. The necessity of conducting the present study is the lack of sufficient legal literature in this field to provide desirable and efficient monitoring of the professional behavior of MPs, which the continuation of this process can increase the costs of establishing an efficient and effective system and provide opportunities for missing opportunities. Accordingly, the main purpose of the present study can be considered the pathology of the current mechanism for monitoring the professional conduct of parliamentarians in the Iranian legal system. The authors also seek to answer the main question: what is the nature and type of oversight of the Board of Deputies? The sub-questions of the research are: 1- How effective is the current oversight of the Anti-Corruption Board and the accountability of the members of parliament? 2- What is the limit of monitoring the professional behavior of the deputies with the parliamentary immunity of the deputies? 3- What are the strategies to achieve the goals of monitoring the professional behavior of the representatives in line with the idea of good governance or governance? It is assumed that the current mechanism for monitoring the professional conduct of parliamentarians lacks the components of an effective and efficient oversight and does not meet the objectives of the desired governance model. For this purpose, with the descriptive and analytical method in three speeches, we first deal with the concept of supervision and explain the nature of monitoring the behavior of representatives (first speech). Then, we consider the components of monitoring (second speech). Then, we will examine the monitoring of the professional behavior of the representatives in Iranian law and try to introduce the shortcomings and gaps in the current monitoring system (third speech). Finally, in the conclusion section, we will provide practical solutions to eliminate these shortcomings and gaps.
