Arbitration has increasingly emerged as one of the most significant mechanisms for dispute resolution in administrative contracts, particularly in large-scale infrastructure and international projects, due to its effectiveness in enhancing efficiency, neutrality, and foreign investment protection.Nevertheless, the acceptance or rejection of arbitration in such contracts is profoundly influenced by the structure of domestic public law and its interaction with international arbitration standards.Employing a descriptive–analytical and comparative methodology, this study examines the concept of arbitrability in administrative contracts within the legal systems of Iran, France, and the United States, with a particular focus on the interaction between three key elements:party autonomy, the distinction between sovereign and commercial activities of the state(acta jure imperii versus acta jure gestionis),and public policy limitations.The findings indicate that in the United States, party autonomy functions as a dominant principle, rendering arbitration broadly acceptable in administrative contracts.France, while preserving the fundamental principles of administrative law, has adopted a selective and conditional approach, allowing arbitration in international administrative contracts subject to compliance with core public law requirements. In contrast, the Iranian legal system continues to adopt a restrictive stance toward arbitration in administrative contracts, largely dueto legislative gaps, an expansive interpretation of “public property”under Article45,and a non-harmonized interpretation of Article77of the Constitution.This approach does not fully align with the UNCITRAL Model Law and prevailing international arbitration practice.The study concludes that through the reinterpretation of constitutional provisions, revision of Article2of the Iranian International CommercialArbitrationAct,and institutionalization of pre.arbitration mechanisms such as Dispute Avoidance and Adjudication Boards it is possible to