The Paradox of Public and Private Interest: A Case Study on the Impact of a Private Law Interpretation of &#039;Public Beneficiary&#039; on the Limitation of Public Oversight in the Administrative Justice Tribunal.

Shoaa, Majid; Abolfazli Karizi, Hossein; Tahery, Mohsen

doi:10.22034/mral.2026.2074512.1763

The Paradox of Public and Private Interest: A Case Study on the Impact of a Private Law Interpretation of 'Public Beneficiary' on the Limitation of Public Oversight in the Administrative Justice Tribunal.

Articles in Press

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

Majid Shoaa ¹

Hossein Abolfazli karizi ²

Mohsen Tahery ¹

¹ Department of Public Law, Se.c., Islamic Azad University, Semnan, Iran

² Department of Political Sciences, FPS, Islamic Azad University, Semnan, Iran

10.22034/mral.2026.2074512.1763

Abstract

The Administrative Justice Court is recognized as the central administrative judiciary body in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, positioned at the heart of public oversight and the guarantee of the rule of law. However, in practice, this institution faces a fundamental challenge: a conflict between its legal mission to safeguard 'public rights' and its entrapment in a reductionist interpretation of the concept of 'interested party'. Through an in-depth study of the Court's judicial opinions, this article argues that the 'dominant doctrine of the interested party'has imprisoned public oversight within an interpretive confinement of private law narrow-mindedness. The primary focus of this analysis is on 'individual decisions with general effects'; those decisions of administrative authorities which are ostensibly personal and specific, but inherently leave fateful impacts on the entirety of society and public interests. findings indicate that this category of decisions is caught in a 'supervisory vacuum': the General Board of the Court considers them under the jurisdiction of its branches due to their 'case-specific' nature, and the branches, citing the 'lack of direct interest' of complainant, issue orders to dismiss the complaint. This vicious cycle effectively blocks the possibility of public oversight over the most important governmental decisions and has transformed the Court from an institution for 'enforcing rights' into a bastion for 'granting immunity' to power. Ultimately, this article proposes transitioning from this inefficient paradigm by redefining the 'doctrine of the interested party' and recognizing the 'public interest standing' in the discourse of Iranian administrative law.

Keywords

Public Oversight

Administrative Justice Court

Doctrine of Interested Party

Subjects