This article adopts a structural-institutional approach to analyze the functions of judicial review in contemporary legal orders. It seeks to demonstrate that the efficacy of this institution is a function of the "level of review" (constitutional versus administrative-executive) and the "institutional design of the reviewing body" (centralized/decentralized, abstract/concrete, and the degree of independence and interpretive authority). The central research question is: How are the functions of judicial review distributed across the constitutional and administrative levels, and under what institutional conditions can these functions be effective in maintaining the balance of powers, consolidating the legal order, protecting fundamental rights, and ensuring social control? Accordingly, the article first elucidates the concept and types of judicial review, and then analyzes its three primary functions — (1) legitimation and consolidation of the legal order (including trust-building and resolution of institutional conflicts), (2) protection and control of power (including protection of fundamental rights and minorities, and control of political and executive power), and (3) institutional regulation and deterrence (including social control and deterrence against abuse and corruption) — in relation to the level of review and the characteristics of the reviewing body. Subsequently, through a comparative study of three models (active review in liberal democratic systems, limited review in semi-democratic and consolidated democracies, and symbolic review in authoritarian systems) and an examination of the multi-forum situation in Iran, it is shown that differences among systems can be reduced to differences in the combination of conditions such as independence, structure, legitimacy, and accountability.