بررسی تئوری های حاکم بر مقررات دولتی در حقوق عمومی اقتصادی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

عضو هیات علمی دانشکده حقوق دانشگاه تهران

چکیده

در این مقاله تئوریهای منافع عمومی ، تئوریهای منافع خصوصی و تئوریهای نهادگرایان مقررات دولتی در حوزه حقوق عمومی مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است. هدف این بود که مبانی توجیهی،هدف، علت و چگونگی تاسیس مقررات از دیدگاه صاحبنظران مورد نقد و بررسی قرار گیرد. در این بررسی مشخص شد تئوری‌های منافع عمومی، مقررات دولتی را بعنوان شیوه ای برای تامین منافع عمومی، دستیابی به کارایی بازار، رفع نارسا ئیهای بازار توجیه می کند و تئوری‌های منافع خصوصی مقررات را ناشی از اعمال نفوذ گروههای خاص و بعنوان ابزار گروه های خاص، جهت تامین منافع گروهی خود می بیند. تئوری‌های نهاگرایان بر این نظر است که منافع خصوصی و عمومی و نقش نهادها در بکارگیری مقررات بکار گرفته شود. انتقادهای که بر این تئور یها وارد شده است بیشتر متمرکز بر نقش مقامات و نتایج و پیامد های مقررات است. پیشنهاد مقاله این می باشد که مفهوم "منافع عمومی" با تعریفی جدید و جامع و با در نظر گرفتن همه منافع متعارض بویژه نهادها و گروهها و نخبگان اقتصادی مورد بازنگری قرار گیرد. مقررات موجود کشورمان مطابق شرایط زمانی ، مکانی و مطابق ارزشهای خاص جامعه خودمان باز سازی شود. همچنین با تبیین مبانی مقررات بر مبنای درست وبا ایجاد یک نظام صحیح بر اساس ارزشهای حقوقی خود، اهداف اجتماعی ، اقتصادی و سیاسی امروزکشورمان براورده شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

examination of the theories of state;' regulation in public economic law

نویسنده [English]

  • Reza Tajarlou
Academic Member of Faculty of Law of Tehran University
چکیده [English]

In this paper the main theories of regulation including; public interest theories, private interest theories ) capture theory( and institutionalist theories of regulation was examined. The aim was to consider the underlying policy and the reasons of regulation and to find out how the regulation has been constituted. It was found that the Public interest theories consider the regulation for achieving public interest, market efficiency and to solve the market failure. Capture theory considers the regulation as a device for achieving the private interest of groups by monopolizing and affecting in policy making and legislation. Institutionalist’ theories have this view that the public interests، private interests and institutionals’ interests should be combined together in constituting the regulations. The recommendation of this paper is that we need to take account all different interests, for example we should give attention to public interests, the interests of social institutionals and the interests of economic elites and in the main time the monopoly should be prevented. The regulation of our system should be reformed according to our conditions and according to our social values.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • public interest theories"
  • private interest theories"
  • institutionalist theories of regulation"
  • "
  • market failure"
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